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Abstract
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggregate cap
on emissions is distributed in the form of allowance permits, and baseline-and-credit, in
which ﬁrms earn emission reduction credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoreti-
cal considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will diﬀer if baselines are
instituted in the form of an emission technology performance standard because this creates
a subsidy to output that results in increased emissions. This is in opposition to the pre-
diction that, when ﬁrm output capacity is ﬁxed, the short-run equilibria of the two plans
will be identical. As a ﬁrst step towards testing the long-run model, this paper reports
on a laboratory experiment designed to test the short-run prediction. A computerized
environment has been created in which subjects representing ﬁrms choose emission tech-
nologies under ﬁxed output capacity and participate in markets for emission rights and for
output. Our evidence supports the theoretical prediction that the two trading mechanisms
yield similar aggregate emissions, however signiﬁcant diﬀerences between plan outcomes
are discussed and both plans exhibit signiﬁcant deviations from the predicted equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Policy and research interest in emission trading systems have increased during the last
decade and a half, even though economists have long advocated market-based environmen-
tal regulations (Dales 1968). Researchers often support incentive-based regulation over
traditional command-and-control methods on the basis of its superior cost-eﬀectiveness
(Montgomery 1972; Hahn and Hester 1989). It is the potential cost savings of tradable
emission schemes that has likely led to their prominence in the United States 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments and in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.1
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments led the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to enact a trading program for sulphur dioxide emissions from power
plants. In addition to theoretical scrutiny, valuable incite into EPA-style trading schemes
has come from economists using laboratory methods (e.g. Cason and Plott 1996; Cason
1997). The EPA’s sulphur dioxide trading market is a form of cap-and-trade emission re-
duction program which, until recently, has been the predominant focus of research. There
has been very little theoretical and experimental analysis on alternative forms of emission
trading. This lack of research is surprising, considering that past environmental regula-
tion in Canada (PERT 1997) and the U.S. (e.g. regulations surrounding the new source
performance standards enacted in the 1970s) employed a diﬀerent trading mechanism:
baseline-and-credit.2
Given the cost savings ability of emission trading schemes, it is not surprising that they
are currently being used around the world as part of various forms of environmental reg-
ulation. Hasselknippe (2003) presents a comprehensive overview of the myriad of systems
for emission trading used by various national governments. In addition to categorizing
emission trading plans as being either suspended, active, planned or proposed, the author
also categorizes them as being either mandatory or voluntary and, even more importantly
for our purposes, cap-and-trade or baseline-and-credit based. In his international survey
of emission trading, Hasselknippe ﬁnds that credit schemes are just as prevalent as capped
schemes, with 20 out of 42 national schemes using a baseline-and-credit system. More-
over, many governments, such as the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (OMOE 2003)
in Canada, have recently implemented hybrid emission trading schemes using elements
from both cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit mechanisms. This paper reports on the
1Article 17 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol describes emission trading as part of an overall strategy to
achieve strict greenhouse gas targets.
2See Tietenberg (2000, Ch. 16) and Dewees (2001) for a more detailed discussion on the historical use
of these two systems in North America.
2ﬁrst laboratory study to compare these two policy instruments.
Under a cap-and-trade plan, an aggregate cap is placed on emissions. A corresponding
quantity of emission permits, often called allowances, is created. Firms must surrender
an allowance for every unit of emission discharged over a given period of time. Firms
may sell allowances that they expect not to use, or purchase allowances to cover emissions
in excess of the original distribution. Under a rate-based baseline-and-credit plan, ﬁrms
are prescribed a performance standard specifying the target industry emission rate. An
emission rate represents the emission technology level of a ﬁrm and is the amount of
pollution that is emitted per unit of output. This concept is sometimes referred to as
emission intensity.3 Simply put, “clean” ﬁrms with emission rates below the performance
standard create permits, in this context often referred to as emission reduction credits
(ERCs). On the other hand, “dirty” ﬁrms possessing emission rates above the performance
standard are required to purchase and redeem ERCs. The quantity of credits created or
redeemed is calculated by multiplying output by the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s emission
rate and the industry performance standard. This type of baseline-and-credit plan is often
called a rate-based system of “tradable performance standards”. Consequently, the cap-
and-trade mechanism uses an absolute framework, in that an allowance must be redeemed
to the authorities for every unit of pollution produced, while rate-based baseline-and-
credit trading uses a relative frame, where ﬁrms must account for only deviations from
their performance standard baseline.
To be clear, by “cap-and-trade” we refer to an emission trading system in which
permits are endowed by the regulator, rather than auctioned, using a grandfathering
approach based on historical data.4 These permit endowments enforce a ﬁxed cap on
emissions. We compare this typical cap-and-trade setup to a rate-based baseline-and-
credit system which implements a regulated emission rate performance standard which
causes the inherent emission cap to be linked to output.
Under these assumptions, theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria
of the two plans will diﬀer because an ERC plan with an instituted performance stan-
dard creates a subsidy to output. Compared to an optimal cap-and-trade plan with the
same average emission rate, the baseline-and-credit plan will exhibit higher output and
emissions. Compared to an optimal cap-and-trade plan with the same emissions, the
3Most government documents refer to this concept as emission intensity, likely due to the common use
of the term rate to convey the notion of occurrences per unit of time. This paper, however, will use the
term emission rate, as it more closely resembles the common use of the term in the Economics discipline.
4For a detailed discussion on auctioning permits versus grandfathering them, see Cramton and Kerr
(2002) and Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003).
3baseline-and-credit plan will exhibit a lower and more costly average emission rate. Thus,
baseline-and-credit plans entail an inherent eﬃciency loss, even before considering costs
of administration. In the short-run, when output capacity is ﬁxed, theory predicts iden-
tical outcomes for the two schemes since the output subsidy cannot possibly lead to an
expansion of output. In this paper we compare the two plans under the assumption of
equal average emission rates.
By using the terms long-run and short-run we intend to diﬀerentiate a scenario in
which all factors of production are variable to one in which output is ﬁxed. Thus, the
short-run could be viewed as a time frame in which a ﬁrm can quickly change pollution
technology but cannot inﬂuence its capacity for producing output. One example is the
ability some factories may possess to add or upgrade “end-of-pipe” pollution technology,
such as adding scrubbers to industrial smokestacks, in a time frame in which output
expansion is not possible. A short-run time frame is also one in which output cannot be
expanded but the switch to cleaner fuel inputs is possible.
Although the short- and long-run theoretical predictions are reasonably straightfor-
ward, they rely on competitive equilibria being realized in two interrelated markets: the
market for output and the market for emission permits. Although some market institu-
tions, such as the double auction and the uniform price sealed bid/ask auction, are highly
eﬀective in achieving equilibrium in a single market, it is less evident that competitive
markets can achieve eﬃcient outcomes when ﬁrms must optimize in two or more markets.
If the theoretical predictions are not to be considered a mere curiosity, it would be use-
ful to demonstrate whether the hypothesized potential gains from trade under the two
schemes will actually be achieved in real markets. Laboratory markets are ideal for this
purpose. They can be designed to reﬂect a substantial level of institutional detail while
exerting careful control over a wide range of factors which are uncontrolled in a natural
setting. This is frequently called “testbedding”.
Other than the theoretical analyses of Dewees (2001), Ellerman and Wing (2003) and
Fischer (2001, 2003), little work, and no experimental economic evidence, has been pub-
lished comparing baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade market-based mechanisms. While
this paper presents results from the ﬁrst baseline-and-credit experiment, the only cap-and-
trade experimental environment to involve explicitly chosen emission rates was studied
by Ben-David, Brookshire, Burness, McKee, and Schmidt (1999, 2000). While Ben-David
et al. (1999) uses explicit emission rate choices to investigate the eﬀect of cost hetero-
geneity on market volatility, the Ben-David et al. (2000) environment involves uncertain
reductions in permit endowments to study attitudes on risk and compliance. Because we
4are not currently interested in researching the eﬀect of uncertainty on baseline-and credit
trading, we reserve comparison of our work to the earlier Ben-David et al. paper. Due
to the complexity involved in setting up an experimental environment rich enough to test
for diﬀerences between these two alternative emission trading mechanisms, our research
program has split up the investigation into ﬁrst testing the theoretical prediction in a
short-run setting and later testing it in a more complicated long-run setting.
This paper reports progress on a laboratory experiment designed to testbed basic
forms of cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit methods of emission trading and to test
whether the predicted short-run identical emission levels will actually be realized. This is
a necessary step in order to properly attribute, in future work, any diﬀerences in long-run
emission levels between the two mechanisms to the diﬀerent underlying incentives instead
of to the frames themselves. The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the the-
oretical framework. Secondly, we describe the experimental design we have implemented.
We then describe the laboratory decision making sequence and discuss the predictions of
the model. Subsequently, we report the experimental results and, lastly, we discuss and
conclude our work.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we motivate the experiment by demonstrating that long-run equilibrium
emissions and output are optimal under a cap-and-trade plan and are higher than optimal
under a baseline-and-credit plan with the same industry-average emission rate. We also
establish that emissions and output are identical for the two plans in the short-run. The
theoretical model presented below is a multi-ﬁrm partial equilibrium model based on the
representative agent model used by Fischer (2001, 2003). At the basis of the model is an
industry with a ﬁxed number of perfectly competitive price-taking ﬁrms. Quality of output
is ﬁxed and homogeneous between ﬁrms. We begin by assuming constant marginal costs
of output. The predictions do not require more realistic and complicated assumptions so
the experimental environment is kept as simple as possible.
Consider an industry with N ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [1,...,N] produces qi units of output
at an emission rate of ri =
ei
qi, where ei represents quantity of emissions. Industry output is
Q =
PN




i=1 riqi. Environmental damages
are assumed to be a positive and weakly convex function of total emissions: D = D(E),
D0(E) > 0 and D00(E) ≥ 0. Willingness-to-pay for the output is a weakly concave function
of aggregate output, WTP =
R Q
0 P(z)dz, where P = P(Q) is an inverse demand curve
5with positive ordinate (P(0) > 0) and negative slope (P 0(Q) < 0). The private cost of
production is a linear homogenous function of output and emissions: Ci = Ci(qi,ei) =
qiCi(1,ri). Unit cost Ci(1,ri) can be separated into unit capacity cost ci(ri), which is a
positive and declining function of the emission rate with ci(ri) > 0 and c0
i(ri) ≤ 0, and
unit variable cost wi, which is a constant function of output. Consequently, total cost is
Ci = ci(ri)qi +wiqi. Note that the marginal cost of output is ci(ri)+wi and the marginal





An omnipotent social planner would choose an emission rate and output for each ﬁrm
in order to maximize total surplus, S. The total surplus is composed of the consumer’s
willingness-to-pay for the output minus ﬁrm costs and environmental damage caused by






































∗) ∀i ∈ N (3)
with qi and ri greater than zero.
These conditions require that each ﬁrm’s operations be optimized on two margins. The
eﬃcient abatement condition (2) ensures that abatement is both cost minimizing, since the
marginal abatement cost (MAC) is equated across ﬁrms, and surplus maximizing, since




i) denote the common value of
the −c0
i
∗s. The eﬃcient output condition (3) ensures that output is surplus maximizing
because each ﬁrm’s marginal social cost equals marginal willingness-to-pay. Note that,
although condition (2) determines a unique emission rate for each ﬁrm, condition (3)




is sum to Q∗ and the ri
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∗ is a solution to the surplus
maximization problem.
The social optimum can be supported as a competitive equilibrium under cap-and-
6trade regulation. The regulator distributes Ai allowances to each ﬁrm so that the sum
of allowances granted equals the optimal level of emissions,
PN
i=1 Ai = E∗. Letting Pc





c = P(Q)qi − ci(ri)qi − wiqi − Pc(riqi − Ai). (4)




c) = Pc (5)
if qi is greater than zero, and
P(Q
c) = ci(ri
c) + wi + ri
cPc. (6)
Equation (5) ensures cost minimizing abatement and deﬁnes each ri
c. Equation (6)
requires that each ﬁrm earn zero marginal proﬁt, and identiﬁes Qc. The system (5) and





with Pc and ri
∗ with rc
i. The optimal solution to the surplus maximization problem can
be sustained as a cap-and-trade competitive equilibrium and vice versa.
Under a baseline-and-credit plan, the regulator sets an industry-wide performance
standard, rs. This performance standard characterizes a relative emission target mech-
anism. Firm i’s net demand for credits is (ri − rs)qi, with negative values signifying a
supply of credits. If the price of credits under a baseline-and-credit plan is Pb, ﬁrm i’s




b = P(Q)qi − ci(ri)qi − wiqi − Pbqi(ri − r
s). (7)




b) = Pb (8)
if qi is greater than zero, and
P(Q
b) = ci(ri
b) + wi + ri
bPb − r
sPb. (9)
Equation (8) is the usual eﬃcient abatement condition which deﬁnes each ri
b. Equation
(9) is the usual zero marginal proﬁt condition which determines Qb. Let us assume that
7the regulator sets the emission rate standard equal to the average emission rate under the




∗)/Q∗.5 If the emission standard is binding and
























Equation (11) implies that, if market shares are equal under baseline-and-credit and
cap-and-trade plans, any set of emission rates satisfying the socially optimal abatement
condition (2) also satisﬁes the corresponding baseline-and-credit equilibrium condition
(8).
The baseline-and-credit zero marginal proﬁt condition (9) is similar to optimal equa-
tion (3) with Pb playing the role of marginal damage, D0(). If emission rates are the
same under the two cases (ri
b = ri
∗), then Pb = D0(E∗) and the right hand side of (9) is
equal to the right hand side of (3), except for the term −rsPb. This negative cost term
derives from the Pbrsqi term of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function and represents a subsidy on out-
put causing the output price under baseline-and-credit trading to be less than optimal.
Consequently, because the demand curve for output is assumed to be downward sloping
(P 0(Q) < 0), aggregate output Qb will be higher than aggregate output Q∗ chosen by the
social planner.
Note from (7) that, if a ﬁrm chooses an emission rate equal to the performance stan-
dard, ri = rs, it will not create, nor be required to redeem, any permits. Therefore, its
output and emissions will be unconstrained by the regulatory program. While cap-and-
trade imposes a ﬁxed upper limit on emissions, a baseline-and-credit plan implies that
emissions will vary with output. The welfare implications of variable emissions are dis-
cussed ably by Weitzman (1974) in the context of quantity instruments (cap-and-trade)
versus price instruments (baseline-and-credit).
5We will ﬁnd that setting the performance standard equal to the optimal average emission rate will
result in quantities of emissions and output that are ineﬃciently high. We could set a stricter standard
so that quantities of output and emissions are optimal, but this would require a stricter performance
standard and resulting ﬁrm costs would be ineﬃciently high. Since both methods yield ineﬃciencies, we
choose to focus on the comparison between cap-and-trade and a baseline-and-credit system associated
with a performance standard equal to the average emission rate from the optimal scenario.
8Thus, in a long-run scenario where ﬁrms can choose emission rates and change their
output capacity, the baseline-and-credit scheme will produce higher emissions and output
compared to a cap-and-trade scheme with the same average emission rate. In a short-run
scenario, where ﬁrms can change their emission rates but cannot change their capacity
for producing output, only the emission rate ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the equilibria.
According to equations (2), (5) and (8), the price of permits and each ﬁrm’s marginal
abatement cost equaling the optimal marginal damage is a short-run equilibrium under
both schemes (Pc = Pb = D0(E∗)). If output is ﬁxed at its optimal level (Q = Q∗),
the subsidy to output inherent to the baseline-and-credit plan has no eﬀect other than
increasing marginal proﬁts. Therefore, in the short-run when output is ﬁxed at the optimal
level, cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit emission trading mechanisms will produce
identical results: optimal levels of emissions and output. The predictions of our short-run
model discussed above are consolidated in the following propositions.
In the short-run, when ﬁrm output capacities are ﬁxed at their optimal levels...
Proposition 1 the cap-and-trade competitive equilibrium outcome is identical to the baseline-
and-credit competitive equilibrium outcome. Therefore, aggregate emissions are identical
under both plans.
Proposition 2 the cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit competitive equilibria are iden-
tical to the socially optimal equilibrium.
3 Experimental Design
Testing the two competing trading mechanisms requires a relatively complex experimental
environment. Unlike most emission trading experiments which tend to focus on individual
aspects of the trading mechanism (e.g. Cason 1995; Cason and Plott 1996), our exper-
iment is conducted within a fully speciﬁed institutional framework, much like previous
cap-and-trade work by Godby, Mestelman, Muller, and Welland (1997), Ben-David et al.
(1999) and Muller, Mestelman, Spraggon, and Godby (2002). To date, there has been
no work published on baseline-and-credit experiments. Of the cap-and-trade experiments
cited above, the Ben-David et al. (1999) environment is most relevant to this work as it
is the only cap-and-trade experiment to involve an explicitly chosen emission technology.
Other than Ben-David et al. (1999), most fully speciﬁed experimental emission trad-
ing environments assume ﬁxed output levels and implicitly deﬁned emission abatement
technology choices. In these experiments, subjects traded emission permits; their permit
9holdings at the end of each period (divided by their exogenous output) implicitly deter-
mined their ﬁrm’s emission rate. In these environments, the diﬀerence between choosing
a sub-optimal emission rate and an error made while trading permits could not be iden-
tiﬁed. Ben-David et al. (1999), however, examine a model with exogenously ﬁxed output
in which ﬁrms with diﬀering and chosen abatement technologies attempt to achieve an
optimal allocation of abatement and permits. The objective is to test hypotheses regard-
ing how abatement and cost heterogeneity aﬀect eﬃciency and permit trading volume
and price. This environment involves subjects making an explicit choice of emission
rate: subjects trade permits and then choose one of three possible abatement technology
levels. Despite adding to the complexity of the experimental environment, the authors
implement an explicit emission rate choice to allow them to distinguish between emission
rate/technology choice errors and permit trading errors.6
The experimental environment created for the work presented in this paper is similar
to that described in Ben-David et al. (1999) with the addition of a market for output and
the introduction of output capacity. A fully speciﬁed environment with an emission permit
market, an output market, an explicit emission technology choice and an output capacity
choice is required to test our theoretical predictions concerning the alternative emission
trading plans in a short- and long-run setting. In order to focus on market features
important to our theoretical predictions, the experimental setting necessarily abstracts
from many additional market characteristics which would exist in a naturally occurring
setting. Failure to abstract would possibly make the experimental setting too complex.
Thus, we impose full compliance, abstracting from issues of penalties and monitoring.
Compliance is enforced by restricting output by the ﬁxed capacity level and the current
holding of emission permits. Firms are not able to sell output if they do not have the
required amount of permits to redeem.
To test our propositions regarding cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit emission
trading schemes in a controlled short-run laboratory setting, we require only a very basic
experimental design. Given that this paper is part of a larger research agenda using the
same basic framework, we chose to run 3 experimental sessions involving cap-and-trade
regulation and 3 experimental sessions involving baseline-and-credit regulation. Each of
these 6 sessions involves 8 subjects and was run between March and April 2004. All 48
recruited subjects were McMaster University undergraduates who had passed a standard
6The authors model their abatement technology decision as being “irreversible”. Once a cleaner
technology, or lower emission rate, has been chosen, the ﬁrm cannot revert back to a dirtier technology
at a later decision period.
10ﬁrst year Economics course. Due to the relatively complicated experimental setting, sub-
jects were paid a ﬂat rate to undergo training in an environment similar to the one in
which they were to participate.7 The training consisted of instructions being read aloud, a
basic questionnaire to ascertain participant understanding, and a 4 period practice exper-
iment with a unique parameterization. Afterward, subjects participated in the ten period
experiment reported in this paper. Sessions lasted between 2 and 3 hours including a
break. Experiment earnings were based on each ﬁrm’s cash holdings at the end of the
experiment. Subjects earned between $10 and $81.75 with a mean of $42.69, including
the training fee of $10.
The software implementation of the laboratory environment was programmed at Mc-
Master University using Borland’s Delphi programming environment and the MySQL
open source database. All sessions were run at the McMaster University Experimental
Economics Laboratory. The fully speciﬁed environment contains an emission permit mar-
ket, an output market and an explicit emission technology choice. The program also
allows for an output capacity choice, which is not used for the short-run experiments
presented in this paper. Screen shots of the software are provided in Appendix A.
Unlike most experiments, the software for this project is framed using terminology from
the pollution abatement context. Preliminary pilot sessions with human subjects were
discovered to be hampered by instructions and software which framed the experiment in
neutral terms. A neutral framing was rejected so as not to complicate an already complex
trading environment. With a complicated environment, experimenters stand the chance
of losing control if subjects are forced to create their own, possibly faulty, context for
understanding the underlying economic incentives. Framing the experiment in context
not only allows for more control over subjects’ interpretation across treatments, but allows
for an environment in which the operation of alternative emission trading plans could be
demonstrated to students and policy makers. Experimental instructions are provided in
Appendix B.
During the experiment, we presented a short-run frame in which each subject is told
that he or she represents a ﬁrm producing output at a constant cost up to a ﬁxed capacity
level of 4 (k = 4). The variable cost of production, wi, is set to zero.
We employed a design using eight ﬁrms per session. Two ﬁrms have one of four
diﬀerent marginal abatement cost schedules, from A to D. The type D “dirty” ﬁrms have
the steepest MAC curves, the type A “cleanest” have the ﬂattest. Subjects were presented
with MAC curves represented by step functions. These functions are broken down into
7This ﬂat rate allows subjects to test diﬀerent strategies without aﬀecting their remuneration.
11nine steps corresponding to emission rate possibilities ranging in integer values between
0 and 9. While Ben-David et al. (1999) implement an explicit emission rate choice with
three possible levels, results from robot simulations reported by Buckley, Muller, and
Mestelman (2003) provide evidence that MAC functions with a limited number of steps
may contribute to volatility of permit prices, emission rates and aggregate emissions.
MAC functions for this experiment are implemented with nine steps so as to make the
function more continuous without making the environment too complex. The general
form used for the unit capacity cost function is,
ci(ri) = u0 + (u1 − u0)[(rmax − ri)/rmax]
αi, (12)
with rmax set to 9. Steps of the relevant MAC function can be found by calculating
the cost diﬀerences between integer emission rate values between 0 and 9 (i.e. ci(ri =
j) − ci(ri = j + 1) ∀j ∈ [0,8]). A graphical illustration and discussion of each ﬁrm
type’s MAC curve is provided in the discussion below on the laboratory decision making
sequence.
Under cap-and-trade regulation, subjects receive an allotment of 20 allowance per-
mits at the beginning of each period. Under baseline-and-credit regulation, subjects are
assigned a common emission rate performance standard of rs = 5. This is the average
overall emission rate in the cap-and-trade treatment equilibrium.8 The demand for output
is exogenous and is represented by the inverse demand function P = 320 − 5Q, where P
is the output price and Q is the quantity demanded.
Table 1 presents ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters used in the short-run sessions reported in
this paper. Table 2 summarizes the associated short-run equilibrium predictions under
the alternative emission trading mechanisms.
4 Decision Making Sequence
The laboratory environment created for this project transforms the simultaneous decision
framework presented in Section 2 into a sequential decision making process. The ﬁrst
action to be taken in a period involves allowances and credits to be traded in a call
8Since the average emission rate under cap-and-trade is equal to 5 and output capacity is equal to 4,
ﬁrms generate 20 units of pollution on average in equilibrium, using up the total endowment of permits.
Under baseline-and-credit, the performance standard of an emission rate of 5 enforces that the average
emission rate per ﬁrm is also 5. However, in this case without endowments, some ﬁrms create supplies of
permits by choosing low emission rates and later sell them to other ﬁrms with emission rates above the
performance standard.
12Table 1: Short-Run Cost Parameters
Optimal C&T B&C B&C
Emission Endowment Performance Initial
Firm Type u1 u0 α wi Rate Each Period Standard Credits
A-cleanest 172 88 3 0 2 20 5 12
B-clean 249 64 3 0 4 20 5 4
C-dirty 375 52 3 0 6 20 5 0
D-dirtiest 1852 29 3 0 8 20 5 0
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
Table 2: Short-Run Predictions
Price of
Trading Allowances Output Aggregate Aggregate Active
Institution or Credits Price Output Emissions Firm Types
B&C 16 160 32 160 A,B,C,D
C&T 16 160 32 160 A,B,C,D
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
Figure 1: Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
13market. This occurs immediately following the endowment of allowances upon ﬁrms
under cap-and-trade regulation. The permit call market is held as a uniform price sealed
bid-ask auction in which submitted bids and asks are ordered in descending and ascending
order, respectively. A market clearing price is then determined and all successful orders
are traded at the market clearing price. Production of output generates emissions at a
rate of r emission-units per unit of output q. Knowing that output is constrained by
capacity and permit holdings, each ﬁrm, once the permit market is cleared, can choose its
own emission rate ranging from zero to nine. The ten possible choices give an acceptable
approximation to a continuous variable. Figure 1 presents the 4 ﬁrm types’ marginal
abatement cost curves and their equilibrium emission rates of 2, 4, 6 and 8 associated
with the equilibrium permit price of $16. Because the computer software only allows
emission rates to be integer values, the eﬀective marginal abatment cost curves are step
graphs. Total ﬁxed cost, c(r)k, depends on the emission rate chosen.
Given that the demand for output is assumed to be exogenous to the participating
ﬁrms, the output market oﬀers a relatively simple strategic environment compared to the
permit market. To keep the environment simple, we impose a straightforward output
pricing rule in which minimal asks are entered in the output market on behalf of all ﬁrms.
Eﬀectively, this forces ﬁrms to sell the maximum amount of output possible, constrained
by capacity and permit holdings, at the market-bearing price. At the end of each period,
allowances are redeemed and credits are created/redeemed by the governing authority.
Any permits held over at the end of the period are automatically banked until the pro-
ceeding period. The number of credits created or redeemed under an ERC plan cannot be
computed until all decisions have been made for the current period due to the fact that
the quantity depends on a ﬁrm’s emission rate choice and the amount of output produced
and sold. This creates a lag in sellers’ inventories of permits under baseline-and-credit
that does not exist under cap-and-trade.9 Financial results for each trading period are
reported in a conventional double-entry accounting framework allowing for realistic ac-
counting statements not often found in controlled laboratory settings. The sequence of
events detailed above is summarized in the ﬂow chart in Figure 2.
For our purposes, keeping the market institution constant across treatments is es-
sential. A multi-unit uniform price sealed bid-ask auction was chosen because of the
relatively quick trading time and high eﬃciency associated with it.10 As discussed by
9The inherent lag in credit creation mimics an important characteristic of many real world baseline-
and-credit style emission trading systems. In systems such as the OMOE (2003) ERC plan, credits are
not created until they have actually been realized and regulator veriﬁed on a project-by-project basis.
10The uniform price auction is very similar to the one used by the New York Stock Exchange to set
14Figure 2: Sequence of Events in a Typical Period
15Smith, Williams, Bratton, and Vannoni (1982), while traders have incentives to bid below
values and ask above costs, traders of infra-marginal units near the margin that deter-
mine price should fully reveal costs and values to avoid being excluded from the market by
extra-marginal units. Therefore, misrepresentation is not expected to aﬀect the uniform
market clearing price.
The lag inherent to the baseline-and-credit mechanism in this framework reveals a ma-
jor operational diﬀerence between cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit systems. Only
permits currently held in inventory can be sold in a given period, creating a “production-
to-demand” setting under cap-and-trade and an “advance production” setting under
baseline-and-credit. By choosing lower emission rates, cap-and-trade ﬁrms can eﬀectively
increase their supply of permits for sale in the current period. This increase in supply can
be valued at the marginal abatement cost of having to lower their emission rate in the
ﬁrst place. In “production-to-demand” fashion, a ﬁrm can ask its marginal abatement
cost for its supply of permits and subsequently choose an emission rate consistent with
the amount sold. On the other hand, the permit market for ERCs is akin to an advance
production model because a ﬁrm that decreases its emission rate below the performance
standard in the current period will not increase the amount of permits it can sell until the
next period, at which point the cost of creating the permit supply is technically sunk. It
remains to be seen whether this lag will create behavioural diﬀerences in the laboratory,
even though the theoretical equilibrium discussed above is not aﬀected. Evidence from
experimental advance production markets points to advance production inventory being
priced close to marginal cost. Mestelman and Welland (1991) ﬁnd minor support for lower
prices under advanced production markets than under production-to-demand markets in
an environment with costless inventory carryover which is similar to our own.11 However,
the authors conclude that the two production models generate similar price distributions
and prices under production to demand are signiﬁcantly higher than the price of zero
suggested by the sunk cost theory.
Simulations reported by Buckley et al. (2003) provide evidence that this lag will
create permit market volatility at the start of each experiment if ﬁrms are not initially
given credits to sell in the ﬁrst period. To eliminate this fabricated disturbance, it was
decided that baseline-and-credit ﬁrms with equilibrium emission rates below the perfor-
mance standard would start the ﬁrst period of the experiment with the number of credits
that they produce in equilibrium. Initial credit inventories are presented in Table 1.
daily opening prices based on bid and ask oﬀers submitted prior to the market opening.
11The authors’ work investigates both double auction and posted oﬀer market trading institutions.
165 Experimental Predictions
Because the trading mechanisms, one absolute and one relative, will be tested under
identical ﬁrm and environment speciﬁcations, theory predicts no diﬀerence in outcomes
when capacity is ﬁxed and emission rates are variable. However, there are reasons to raise
doubts around this prediction in the laboratory market. Below is a discussion of four
reasons why cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit outcomes may diﬀer in the short-run.
One must keep in mind that ineﬃciency in this environment is a dynamic phenomenon.
A choice made by one ﬁrm will impact the optimal action that all other ﬁrms should
take in the following decision period. The beauty of incentive-based market solutions to
emissions control is that the market price for permits provides information to guide future
decisions.
The ﬁrst reason why the mechanisms may produce short-run discrepancies is that the
relative permit trading framework of baseline-and-credit could easily be perceived as more
complex than the absolute frame of the cap-and-trade mechanism. Previous experimental
work in the area of research and development externalities has demonstrated signiﬁcant
behavioural diﬀerences caused by subsidies that are framed in an “absolute” fashion when
compared to those framed in a “relative” manner (Buckley, Mestelman, and Shehata
2003). On the other hand, the relative framing of baseline-and-credit regulation might
inadvertently lend more stability to ﬁrms that make errors. For example, if a baseline-
and-credit ﬁrm mistakenly sells all of its permits, this does not preclude the ﬁrm from
choosing a relatively high emission rate equal to the performance standard to sell output.
A cap-and-trade ﬁrm with no permits, however, cannot sell any output unless it chooses
a costly emission rate of zero.
Secondly, the relative framing implies that ﬁrms hold fewer permits in a baseline-and-
credit plan. Fewer permits in baseline-and-credit trading markets could have important
repercussions for out-of-equilibrium behaviour. The relative framing may cause more
instability under baseline-and-credit as less permits make for thinner markets. When
the same absolute number of permits is accidentally traded or not traded, the emission
trading institutions may be aﬀected diﬀerently. In addition, the reduced stock of permits
may lead to market power for low abatement cost ﬁrms which supply most of the permits
in this thin market.
An additional reason why one might expect a diﬀerence between the two schemes
hinges on the fact that the total supply of permits is ﬁxed under cap-and-trade but not
under baseline-and-credit. In a cap-and-trade scheme, out-of-equilibrium behaviour might
17temporarily decrease aggregate emissions but, eventually, they can increase to compensate
due to the regulating authority distributing a ﬁxed number of permits which can be carried
in inventory from period to period. However, in a baseline-and-credit plan, the supply of
permits is linked to output and each ﬁrm’s chosen emission rate. If errors are made in
choosing an appropriate emission rate, potential credit supplies, and thus emissions and
output, could be lost forever. Therefore, in the short-run when output capacity is ﬁxed
at its optimal value, lifetime credit supplies might be aﬀected due to the possibility for
potential credits to never be realized in the ﬁrst place. It is assumed that the optimal
number of permits is distributed under an appropriate cap-and-trade plan, implying that
any decrease in the variable permits supply under the comparable baseline-and-credit
mechanism will result in ineﬃciency.
Lastly, the lag in baseline-and-credit permit creation could cause the supply of permits
to lag behind demand in out-of-equilibrium play, creating a timing diﬀerence between the
two institutions. For instance, if a cap-and-trade ﬁrm intends to choose a very low emission
rate in the current period, this will allow it to sell more of its permits this period. Under
baseline-and-credit, however, the ﬁrm would have to wait until the following period to
sell those permits. While this feature may be speciﬁc to our baseline-and-credit scheme
implementation, it mirrors characteristics of many real world credit systems. This is a
requirement in our sequential decision making environment (that does not contain any
“forward” permit markets) since the quantity of emission reduction credits created cannot
be computed until after the credit market has cleared, an emission rate is chosen and
output quantity for the period has been determined.
6 Experimental Results
Although the primary objective of this paper is to compare basic cap-and-trade emission
trading with baseline-and-credit trading, whether behaviour under either system falls
within acceptable bounds of the predicted equilibrium is also of importance. Accordingly,
the analysis of experimental results that follows focuses on mean per session values of
the chief market indicators: permit trading price and volume, output trading price and
volume, aggregate emissions, permit inventory and overall eﬃciency.
186.1 A First Look
A natural question to ask when running an experiment involving an environment as
complicated as the one in this work is whether the subjects understood the underlying
incentives. In this short-run environment where subjects participated in a permit market
and chose an emission rate based on the results of the permit market every period, exam-
ining the permit market behaviour will provide a good indication of subject behaviour.
An obvious benchmark to compare the bid-ask behaviour of subjects in this experiment is
the behaviour from a similar uniform price auction presented by Cason and Plott (1996).
The uniform price auctions investigated by Cason and Plott (1996) occur in a solitary
auction setting less complicated than the fully speciﬁed environment presented here. The
Cason and Plott environment is a static repeated game with ﬁxed cost and redemption
values, not one where past permit market and emission rate decisions made by all subjects
aﬀect the underlying permit market values possessed by each subject during the current
period. In addition, the subjects in the Cason and Plott study are in ﬁxed roles as either
buyers or sellers, while the environment presented in this paper involves traders that will
have incentives to buy and sell, at diﬀerent prices, depending on current permit inventory.
The Cason and Plott auctions are applicable, however, since they involve 4 buyers and 4
sellers, identical to the equilibrium values in our 8 subject environment. While the buyers
and sellers in Cason and Plott (1996) implicitly had a ﬁxed output equal to 1 and an
implicitly deﬁned emission rate with 5 possible values, the environment presented in this
work imposes a ﬁxed output equal to 4 with an explicit emission rate choice between 10
possible values.
In the Cason and Plott (1996) static uniform price auction sessions, subjects tend to
reveal their true costs and values, especially for units near the margin that decide price.
Figure 3 presents results of our experiment that are similar to those presented by Cason
and Plott, graphing actual bids and asks against the underlying incentives for periods 2
and 9 for each of the 6 short-run sessions. In each graph in Figure 3, light grey circles
denote actual asks, dark grey squares denote actual bids and the thin lines illustrate
the underlying incentives. One must remember that, as previously discussed, there is
an incentive for subjects to misrepresent their true values in a multi-unit uniform price
bid-ask auction, although traders of infra-marginal units near the margin that determines
price are expected to fully reveal underlying values. Looking at the six session graphs in
Figure 3, one can ascertain that subject behaviour appears very rational: bids and asks,
especially those close to the price margin, tend to reveal the true underlying values, and













































20and-credit make larger bid-ask pricing errors at the beginning of the experiment than
subjects facing cap-and-trade. Comparing the period 2 to period 9 results for both plans,
this diﬀerence disappears over time. It is remarkable how similar the results illustrated in
Figure 3 are to those found in the simpler Cason and Plott environment. We acknowledge
this as evidence that the subjects in our short-run experiment were not overwhelmed by
the complex environment and were acting in accordance to the underlying incentives.
6.2 Permit Market, Output Market and Aggregate Emissions
The overall data analysis strategy adopted for this work and presented in this section was
decided before running any sessions. Because of the dynamic nature of the experiment
whereby subjects’ decisions in one period can directly aﬀect the optimal decision a subject
should take in the next period, each experimental session only provides one truly indepen-
dent observation. This implies that, with the six session design used, we can only compute
our statistical tests using six independent observations. Due to data convergence typically
found in laboratory experiments with multiple periods, it was decided that, while ﬁgures
Table 3: Mean Values over Periods 6 to 9 by Treatment
Permit Market Output Aggregate Permit
Price** Volume** Volume* Emissions Inventories
Cap-and-Trade:
Session 1 11.75 29.00 29.00 155.25 56.00
Session 2 6.88 20.50 30.25 178.00 60.25
Session 3 6.63 23.25 29.50 179.75 60.75
Treatment Mean 8.42 24.25 29.58 171.00 59.00
Baseline-and-Credit:
Session 4 22.00 18.75 32.00 161.00 34.00
Session 5 14.75 14.00 30.00 177.75 59.00
Session 6 20.00 18.50 32.00 176.00 51.00
Treatment Mean 18.92 17.08 31.33 171.58 48.00
Prediction: 16.00c 32.00cb 32.00c 160.00 0.00cb
* Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test at a 10% critical level.
** Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney
U-test at a 10% critical level.
c The cap-and-trade treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
b The baseline-and-credit treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
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would be provided illustrating summary results from periods 1 to 10, all statistical tests
would be based on the mean market indicators over periods 6 to 9 only. This will account
for any learning eﬀects or decision errors made in the initial periods of the experiment.12
Predicted equilibrium values of the main market indicators, based on the theoretical
model presented in Section 2, are provided with the experimentally observed values in
Table 3. The results from signiﬁcance testing using t-tests on the six cap-and-trade
and baseline-and-credit independent observations are also provided in Table 3. A non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U-test was conducted in parallel with each parametric t-test.
Due to small sample sizes involved in testing, the exact distribution function of “U” was
used (Mendenhall, Reinmuth, and Beaver 1993). Our strategy is for each hypothesis to
be tested using the above parametric and nonparametric methods at the 5% and 10%
level.
Figure 4 illustrates the minimum, maximum and mean session permit price under
each emission trading mechanism. This indicates that the observation at the top edge of
12Period ten is dropped from all analyses due to an end game eﬀect introduced by the experimental
environment. Subject payoﬀs were calculated using ﬁrm cash holdings at the end of the experiment. It
was decided that subjects’ payoﬀs would not be inﬂuenced by permit inventory held at the end of the
experiment, as diﬀerences between any imposed conversion value and the cost of creating or buying the
permits in the ﬁrst place may ambiguously inﬂuence subject strategies earlier in the session.
22the shaded range represents the session with the highest permit price in each period, the
observation at the bottom edge of the shaded range represents the session with the lowest
permit price in each period and the third and ﬁnal session’s permit price will determine
where the mean permit price ‘bullet’ is placed within the shaded range. According to
Table 3 and Figure 4, the observed trading price for permits appears to be higher under
baseline-and-credit than with cap-and-trade. A t-test comparing the 6 independent mean
trading price observations under the two schemes rejects the null hypothesis of the means
being equal across emission trading treatments at the 10% level. This result appears to
be consistent over the length of the experiment.
In summary, the mean cap-and-trade permit price was $8.42 and the mean baseline-
and-credit permit price was $18.92 over periods 6 to 9. The graphical and tabular data
show that, while initial credit prices are quite high, only the cap-and-trade prices are found
to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the equilibrium prediction of $16 at the 5% level using a
t-test on the period 6 to 9 data. This large early deviation from equilibrium prices under
baseline-and-credit is consistent with our earlier proposition that the more complicated
framing of the credit scheme might lead to greater deviations from equilibrium. The
cap-and-trade permit price converging to levels below the equilibrium prediction is an
unexpected result. Unto itself, a deviation in permit trading price from its equilibrium
value does not necessarily breed ineﬃciency, as it could simply result in a redistribution
of wealth if ﬁrms still choose appropriate emission rates and trade the proper number of
permits.
Figure 5 illustrates frequent shortfalls in permit trading volumes from equilibrium pre-
dictions. Evidence from Table 3 supports the notion that both permit trading programs
result in permit trading volumes that are signiﬁcantly below the predicted equilibrium
level. The per period graphical analysis demonstrates average trading volumes of approx-
imately 24 units for the capped scheme and under 20 units for the credit scheme, volumes
that are signiﬁcantly below their prediction of 32 units. A formal test on all mean session
trading volumes proves that the deviation from the equilibrium is signiﬁcant for both
schemes, using a t-test at a 5% level. Evidence regarding a possible treatment eﬀect is
less clear. Although the volumes in Figure 5 appear to be similar across treatments, Table
3 shows the three mean session volumes to be signiﬁcantly higher under cap-and-trade
than baseline-and-credit. Setting the question of a treatment eﬀect aside, the signiﬁcantly
lower trading volumes indicate that not all gains from trade are being realized and must
cause, or be caused by, ineﬃciently chosen emission rates or output levels. Low trading
volumes and higher trading prices of credits over allowances could be caused by the thin
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market for credits created by the nature of the relative framing of the baseline-and-credit
trading institution, as discussed in Section 5.
Given that, in this environment, the demand side of the output market is represented
by an exogenous demand curve, output price and volume will be perfectly correlated as
per the formula P(Q) = 320 − 5Q. Due to the straight line demand function that was
implemented for output, one need only focus on output trading volume to investigate the
output market as a whole. One must remember that the experimental environment is
a short-run setting in which each of the 8 ﬁrms can only produce and sell a maximum
capacity of 4 units of output. Figure 6 conﬁrms the results from the statistical tests
reported in Table 3. Only the cap-and-trade treatment displays signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(lower) output volumes from the equilibrium prediction (according to a t-test at the 5%
level) but support for a treatment eﬀect is weak. While the trading plan treatment
eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 10% level using a parametric t-test, the output volumes under
the two plans are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 10% level using a non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U-test. This result is consistent with the prediction that, if ﬁrms commit
permit trading errors, ﬁrms under baseline-and-credit are able to choose emission rates
at or below the performance standard of ﬁve in order for the errors to not aﬀect output;
baseline-and-credit ﬁrms can ensure that they will not be required to deliver any permits
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to the regulator by choosing emission rates at or below the performance standard. Cap-
and-trade regulation requires that all ﬁrms with emission rates above zero must deliver
a positive quantity of permits. This regulation diﬀerence allows ﬁrms that made permit
trading errors to produce output at full capacity with lower cost consequences under a
baseline-and-credit system compared to a cap-and-trade plan. This output shortfall in the
cap-and-trade case implies signiﬁcant proﬁt and consumer surplus loss that will emerge in
our calculation of overall eﬃciency. Obviously, if baseline-and-credit ﬁrms tend to make
more permit trading errors, they might experience a greater eﬃciency loss than ﬁrms in
the cap-and-trade case.
The above evidence yields weak support that the two emission trading mechanisms
are diﬀerent. Since the diﬀerence is most pronounced over the initial periods of each
session, this is most likely a consequence of the more complicated relative framework of
the baseline-and-credit institution. However, the evidence regarding aggregate emissions
demonstrates strong support for the theory. Figure 7 highlights an almost identical up-
ward trend of aggregate emissions under cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit trading.
Table 3 cites mean cap-and-trade emission levels at 171 over periods 6 to 9 and com-
parable baseline-and-credit emission levels at 172 over the same time period. The mean
aggregate per period emission levels under cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit are not
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signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (t-test and Mann-Whitney test at the 10% level)
or from the equilibrium prediction of 160 (t-test at a 5% level). As stated in Propositions
1 and 2, there is no diﬀerence in short-run aggregate emission levels in industries under
cap-and-trade or baseline-and-credit regulation, nor are they diﬀerent from the optimal
levels.
One might note that, although not statistically diﬀerent from 160, Figure 7 illustrates
that during the ﬁrst half of the experiment, emission rates are far below 160 and, over the
second half, are above 160. The only explanation for this trend is that permits are being
banked in the ﬁrst half of the experiment and carried in inventory to be later redeemed
to contribute towards producing emissions and output. Is the initial under-polluting and
inventory build-up due to inexperience or strategy/preferences (e.g. risk aversion)? To
help shed light on the issue, we shall examine permit inventories period by period. Figure
8 displays the aggregate inventory held at the end of each period. The diagram shows
how inventories are built up over the ﬁrst half of the experiment, only to be expended in
the second half. Table 3 provides statistical support that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in these inventories under the two mechanisms, but that in both cases inventories are
signiﬁcantly above the predicted rate of zero.
The deﬁnition of inventory used when comparing cap-and-trade and baseline-and-
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credit outcomes excludes credits created at the end of a period when deﬁning the current
period’s inventory. For example, credits created at the end of period 5 are deﬁned as
entering inventory at the beginning of period 6. This deﬁnition of permit inventory allows
for a consistent expectation of zero permit holdings in both cap-and-trade and baseline-
and-credit. Risk neutral, proﬁt maximizing agents are predicted not to carry any inventory
from period to period. Risk averse agents have no incentive to carry permit inventories
past period 10, as subject payoﬀs are solely determined by ﬁrm cash holdings at the end
of the last period. Notice that even though there is no reason to keep an inventory at the
end of the experiment, Figure 8 illustrates that subject inventories are still irrationally
above zero at the end of the ﬁnal period. It is impossible to assess the reason for the
apparent irrationality of carrying inventory by looking at the data alone. Subjects may
bank permits due to misunderstanding the environment or by making permit trading and
emission rate choice errors during the session. Of course, this behaviour may also be the
result of legitimate preferences: subjects might hold inventories in eﬀorts of risk aversion
or for speculative trading. If inventories were brought about by general decision error, one
might think that the more cognitively diﬃcult baseline-and-credit scheme would exhibit
higher inventories and the fact that it actually does not (as evidenced by Figure 8) would
support a “preference” explanation. However, one must also remember that the relative
27frame of the baseline-and-credit scheme creates thin permit markets with potentially
lower permit supplies than under cap-and-trade. These potentially lower permit supplies,
evidenced by the low credit trading volumes in Figure 5, would induce permit inventories
to be lower under baseline-and-credit regulation compared to a cap-and-trade scheme.13
While the exact cause of the high inventory may be indeterminate in the current exper-
imental design, breaking down the inventory by ﬁrm type may shed light on the matter. If
only few subjects dominate the inventory results, or if a speciﬁc ﬁrm type accounts for the
majority of the inventory holdings, this might provide meaningful information. Figures
9 and 10 illustrate mean inventory holdings by ﬁrm type over the three cap-and-trade
sessions and over the three baseline-and-credit sessions.
It must be pointed out that the values underlying the mean treatment results presented
in Figures 9 and 10 are indicative of the separate session results in that all 6 sessions
involved most of the 8 subjects carrying nontrivial quantities of inventories; in other words,
permit inventories were not driven by a few outliers. To investigate whether some ﬁrm
types dominate the inventory holdings, we calculated the percentage of total inventory
carried by type A and B ﬁrms averaged over periods 1 to 9 in each session. Similar
to our other statistics reported in this section, the aforementioned inventory percentage
provides us with 6 truly independent observations. Type A and B ﬁrms are predicted to
be the sellers of permits in the short-run equilibrium and are represented by the darkest
segments in Figures 9 and 10. The mean percentage of inventory held by type A and B
cap-and-trade ﬁrms is 71.4% (3 observations), while the corresponding mean for baseline-
and-credit ﬁrms is 63.9% (3 observations). Using this statistic, type A and B ﬁrms do
not carry a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent proportion of total inventory under cap-and-trade than
they do under baseline-and-credit (t-test, 6 observations, p-value>0.10). Only the cap-
and-trade percentage of 71.4% is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 50% using a two-tailed t-test
at a 10% level of signiﬁcance. Type A and B ﬁrms might carry relatively more inventory
because they have the lowest marginal abatement costs and so are predicted to be sellers in
equilibrium. If subjects misrepresent their true costs in the uniform price permit market
by bidding below their values and asking above their costs, this could lead buyers (type
C and D) to purchase fewer permits, lowering their inventories, and lead sellers (type A
and B) to sell fewer permits, causing them to maintain high inventory levels.
13Having the experiment end after a random number of periods could have possibly been used as a
strategy to eliminate some of the previously mentioned causes of inventory build-up. A random end game
rule was not imposed in our design as we believe that, after the extensive training the subjects were given
in this environment, we could not aﬀord to lose even a single period of decision making data.
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Figure 10: Baseline-and-Credit Mean Inventories at End of Each Period
296.3 Eﬃciency: Gains from Trade
The typical measure of market eﬃciency is not appropriate for this fully speciﬁed exper-
imental environment involving a consumer output market and environmental damages in
addition to the emission permit market. It is important the eﬃciency measure used be
based on the realized consumer surplus, producer surplus and environmental damages.
These three components constitute the social planner’s total surplus function maximized
in the optimal equilibrium. We therefore deﬁne total social surplus, S, as
S = TotalSocialSurplus = ConsumerSurplus + ProducerSurplus
+EnvironmentalSurplus
(13)
where the environmental surplus in our model is negative since it is solely the result
of environmental damages from emissions. In the emission permit trading regulatory
framework, a mechanism’s eﬃciency is framed as the actual (realized) gains from trade
expressed as a percentage of the potential gains from trade. To measure “gains from
trade”, a surplus is computed relative to the benchmark surplus inherent to the command
and control outcome in which the optimal mechanism is imposed but permit trading is
prohibited. Thus, command and control output and emissions will be optimal, however
this will not be achieved at minimum cost in the industry. Therefore, actual gains from
trade are calculated as the diﬀerence between actual total surplus and command and
control total surplus, while potential gains from trade are equal to the diﬀerence between
the optimal total surplus (given by the social planner’s equilibrium) and the command
and control equilibrium. This results in the eﬃciency measure given by
Eﬃciency =
Sactual − Scommand/control
Soptimal − Scommand/control (14)
where S is deﬁned in equation (13). The environmental damage function is assumed to
be weakly convex in our assumptions stated in Section 2. The statistics on eﬃciency
reported in this section assume that environmental damages are expressed by a straight
line, with marginal damage being ﬂat and equal to the optimal marginal damage in the
environment which is equal to 16. Although not reported here, a sensitivity analysis was
conducted assuming a highly convex damage function in which increasing emissions by
50% above the optimal level corresponds to 3 times the environmental damages. The
values presented in the analysis below changed very little under this extreme assumption
and none of the qualitative conclusions were aﬀected.
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Figure 11 illustrates minimum, maximum and mean session eﬃciencies over periods
1 to 10, based on gains from trade as discussed above, for all three sessions under both
emission trading schemes. The graphs show remarkably similar eﬃciencies under both
trading mechanisms. While the percentage of realized gains from trade compared to
the potential gains from trade is below 100%, one must realize that this formulation of
eﬃciency provides a much tougher benchmark (because it is based on deviations from the
command and control outcome) than traditional eﬃciency measures (usually calculated
by actual surplus divided by optimal surplus).
Table 4 presents the quantitative results supporting Figure 11, averaged over periods
6 to 9. In addition, the mean eﬃciency percentage for each session is decomposed into
its primary components according to surplus type. This allows one to verify the driving
forces behind the realized gains from trade compared to the potential gains from trade,
using the command and control outcome as a benchmark. All three component surplus
percentage points sum to the overall eﬃciency of each session. For example, the consumer
surplus component is deﬁned as
ConsumerSurplusComponent =
CSactual − CScommand/control
Soptimal − Scommand/control (15)
31Table 4: Decomposition of Mean Eﬃciency over Periods 6 to 9
Components of Eﬃciency
Consumer Producer Environmental
Eﬃciency Surplus* Surplus Surplus
= + + +
Cap-and-Trade:
Session 1 68.55% -45.03% 106.06% 7.52%
Session 2 56.56% -26.53% 111.60% -28.50%
Session 3 43.82% -37.73% 112.82% -31.27%
Treatment Mean 56.31% -36.43% 110.16% -17.42%
Baseline-and-Credit:
Session 4 77.61% 0.00% 79.19% -1.58%
Session 5 55.29% -28.58% 111.98% -28.11%
Session 6 45.50% 0.00% 70.84% -25.33%
Treatment Mean 59.47% -9.53% 87.33% -18.34%
* Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test at a 10% critical level.
where CS denotes the level of consumer surplus. Again, the environmental surplus will
be negative if environmental damages are positive. For instance, Table 4 contains nega-
tive environmental surplus components for most sessions. This is indicative of aggregate
emission levels above the command and control outcome of 160, a result conﬁrmed by
the evidence in Figures 7 and 8 which illustrate inventories being used forcing aggregate
emissions to be above the equilibrium prediction over the second half of the experiment.
Also, the consumer surplus components are never greater than zero because output
can never exceed the ﬁxed output capacity which is imposed in the command-and-control
benchmark. To provide an example of how to interpret the values in Table 4, an expla-
nation of the ﬁrst line will be provided. The ﬁrst line states that the mean eﬃciency in
periods 6 to 9 in cap-and-trade session 1 was 68.55%, meaning that 68.55% of the potential
gains from trading emission permits was actually realized. 45.03 percentage points of this
eﬃciency were lost due to actual consumer surplus falling below the benchmark, while
106.06 and 7.52 percentage points were due to gains in actual producer and environmental
surplus above the command and control benchmark values, respectively.
Statistical testing indicates that there is no treatment eﬀect on overall eﬃciency. While
the mean cap-and-trade producer surplus is much higher than under baseline-and-credit
over the last four periods (110% compared to 87%), this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant at
the 10% level using a t-test or Mann-Whitney U-test. There is, however, a long lasting
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trade and baseline-and-credit sessions. Table 4 provides support that, over the last 4
periods, consumer surplus is the only component to signiﬁcantly diﬀer between the two
plans, but this result is supported by a t-test at the 10% level only (the corresponding
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test p-value is above 10%). Over these periods, eﬃciency
levels under both schemes are close to 60% of the potential gains from trade, using the
command and control outcome as a benchmark. That both schemes should produce such
similar eﬃciencies is surprising, considering the permit and output market discrepancies
noted in the above paragraphs; however, it is not surprising given our basic theoretical
prediction that both schemes should produce identically optimal results in the short-run.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
The potential cost savings from an emission trading program stems from ﬁrms with dif-
ferent marginal abatement costs reallocating eﬀort between abating and buying permits,
until the marginal abatement costs are equalized and total abatement costs are minimized
in the regulated industry. On their own, neither a cap-and-trade nor a baseline-and-credit
emission trading scheme will decrease emissions. The regulator must continually set lower
and lower caps (under cap-and-trade) or set stricter and stricter performance standards
(under baseline-and-credit) to achieve aggregate emission reduction goals over time. The
question remained, however, whether the theoretical predictions regarding the two mech-
anisms would hold in real markets.
Theory predicts identical short-run outcomes between an appropriate cap-and-trade
plan and a baseline-and-credit plan when the latter imposes a performance standard
consistent with the cap under the former plan. Theory predicts that emissions will be
greater under baseline-and-credit in the long-run because a performance standard acts
like a subsidy on output. This study reports results on controlled laboratory sessions in
a short-run environment.
Despite the host of reasons cited in Section 5 as to why the theoretical predictions may
not be realized, our experimental results suggest otherwise. Although we have observed
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in prices and volumes of permits and output under the
two schemes, we have also found evidence that aggregate emission levels and overall system
eﬃciency are not statistically diﬀerent. Using graphical and tabular data, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that aggregate emission levels under cap-and-trade and baseline-
and-credit are identical and we cannot reject the hypothesis that emissions under either
33scheme are diﬀerent from the theoretically optimal equilibrium prediction. While market
eﬃciency levels are very high, both schemes achieve almost 60% of the potential gains
from trade, using the command and control levels of consumer surplus, producer surplus
and environmental damage as a benchmark. Despite diﬀerences in permit trading prices
and permit and output volume levels, the fact that overall system eﬃciency and aggregate
emission levels are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two schemes suggests that cap-
and-trade and baseline-and-credit will perform equally well as emission control programs
in scenarios involving ﬁxed output capacities. This supports the two propositions we ﬁrst
introduced in Section 2.
One caveat is that the cause of large early permit pricing errors under baseline-and-
credit cannot be identiﬁed. If these errors were caused by a general misunderstanding
of the mechanism, one would not expect this to aﬀect long-run policy considerations.
However, the current experimental design cannot rule out the possibility that experienced
baseline-and-credit traders might exhibit similar pricing errors every time underlying pa-
rameters change in the model or the economy. We leave this important policy question
for further research.
Permit inventories were an essential focus of our short-run analysis. Our initial in-
terest was simply to investigate whether subjects carried inventories at all, and if they
did, whether they would use them all before the end of the the experiment, as predicted.
Results show that while a great deal of inventories were being carried under both trading
plans, these inventories were generally redeemed over the last few periods of the experi-
ment. Our analysis indicates a signiﬁcant ﬁrm type eﬀect under cap-and-trade, whereby
the ﬁrms with the lowest marginal abatement costs tended to carry more than their share
of the inventories, a reasonable result considering that permits are not as directly valuable
to these types of ﬁrms.
With a theoretical framework and corresponding experimental environment having
been designed and tested in the short-run, future work can now assess the long-run theo-
retical prediction of higher output and emissions under baseline-and-credit trading. The
policy implications of work in this area are substantial considering the prevalent use of
both alternative trading mechanisms at the international level.
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